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I. INTRODUCTION* #
The purpose of this article is to address the importance of pre -contractual liability in the
regulation of contemporary commercial relations in an international context.
In first instance, I will address the regulation of pre-contractual agreements under Colombian
domestic law. Second, I will be briefly comparing the application and regulation of pre-
contractual liability in Colombian domestic law with its application in American law. Finally, I
will address its application under the CISG and I will include a brief comparison of this
Convention with Colombian domestic law in respect to this matter.
In addition, I will provide practical examples to illustrate the application of pre-contractual
liability under Colombian domestic law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG).
II. THE EFFECTS OF PRE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS IN COLOMBIA AND
THEIR LIABILITY UNDER THE DOMESTIC LAW
A. Brief Historical Prospective of Pre-Contractual Liability
The law, the doctrine and the jurisprudence in civil law jurisdictions have been regulating issues
related to contractual and extra-contractual liability for centuries. However, only in the last
century have they turned their attention to pre-contractual liability.
In the early years, there was a dilemma in respect to the recognition of pre-contractual liability
because it was understood that this pre-contractual stage did not generate responsibility for the
parties because there was not a contract and they had freedom to decide whether they wanted
to proceed with the negotiations or simply back out from them. Therefore, any cost spent by
the parties in pre-contractual negotiations should been assumed by them if the contract failed
to materialize.
* The subject matter of this paper is an analysis of the CISG Article 7(1) and its consequences. I also examine the
Norwegian implementation of the Convention, how the Norwegian approach relates to the obligations set forth in
Article 7(1), and whether that approach is a loyal compliance with those obligations. I further address the problems
caused by the Norwegian transformation and how those problems might be solved.
# This essay states the law as at 25 January 2007.
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Conversely, it had been held by some scholars that pre-contractual agreements caused liability.
In their opinion, the parties acquire obligations and rights during the pre-contractual stage. For
instance, where two parties have been engaged in extended negotiations for the purchase of a
complex business, they ought to owe to each other the obligation to act in good faith.
Therefore, after one party has invested a large amount of money studying and researching the
business due to its complexity and in reliance on the other party’s intention to reach a future
agreement, the party ought to be compensated for the economical loss caused by the unjustified
withdraw from the negotiations by the other party. The innocent party should be able to
demand the relief for the damage caused by such conduct. The innocent party should be
allowed to recover the pecuniary loss for the cost of his investment and the loss of
opportunities.
These situations were the ones that inspired Rudolph von Jhering to write his monographic on
“ culpa in contrahendo.” 1 His goal was to eliminate the injustice that was generated by the
impossibility to impose responsibility on the party that without justification and reason
withdrew from pre-contractual negotiations causing damages to the other contracting party. It is
imperative to indicate that the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo is intimately related to the
concept of good faith and presupposes fault or negligence by the guilty party.
Precisely, the foundation of the Jhering theory is based on the principle of the good faith that
has to be observed between the contracting parties since the beginning of the negotiations.
The doctrine of pre-contractual liability considers the damages that occur as a consequence of
the conduct of one of the parties that produced the nullity of the contract or generated the
conditions for the cancellation of the negotiations. As mentioned above, the doctrine also
considers the damages generated by the intentional and unjustified rupture of the negations by
one of the parties.
One example of such conduct is when the seller, knowing that he is not the owner of the goods,
sells them to the buyer. In such a situation, the contract will be void because it will be
impossible for the performance of the contract since the goods belong to a third party who is
not part of the transaction and will claim his ownership of the goods.
Similarly, under the doctrine of pre-contractual liability, a party will be held liable for damages
when initiating the previous negotiations with respect to the purchase of a corporation with the
intention to gather confidential information of the business and abruptly interrupt the
negotiations after the accomplishment of this purpose.
Before the formulation of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, the law appeared to have ignored
pre-contractual stages, more specifically what happened before the formation of the contract,
even though, the parties had been involved in extended, complex and expensive negotiations
that required them to act in good faith and with due diligence.
1 Rudolph von Jhering, “ Culpa in contrahendo: oder Schadensersatz bei michtigen oder nicht zur Perfektion
gelangten Verträgen, Jherings Jahrbücher !V (1861) 1-113.
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This historical perspective leads one to think that pre-contractual liability is supported not only
in Jhering’s theory but also in the principles of good faith, fair dealing and unjust enrichment.
It is paramount that once parties enter into contractual negotiations, they owe to each other a
relationship of trust and confidence regardless of the negotiation’s success or failure.
B. Pre-Contractual Agreements and Their Liability Under Colombian Law
Pre-contractual agreements are intimately connected with what are called “ pre contractual
relations.”  Pre-contractual relations arise between the parties who are interested in entering into
a contract. These relations arise from the first contacts between the parties until the adoption of
a preparatory contract. Such preparatory contracts are termed under the Colombian legislation
“ la option o la promesa de contratar”  which means the option or the promise to enter into a
contract. This stage is known as the “ pre-contractual period.” 2
In our complex economic world, we can find that there are contracts that can be concluded
instantaneously according to the nature of their object or their small economic value such as
the trading of regular and domestic consumer products which are displayed on supermarket
shelves with their prices marked indicating that offers to the public have been made and
therefore, it is possible to immediately acquire them for the payment of the price by the
consumer. However, there are other kinds of contracts that for their nature and high economic
value require a long period of negotiation as well as technical and budget studies by the
contracting parties; therefore, the formation of such contracts is progressive. Such contracts, for
instance, can be for the construction of complex structures like airports, railroads or the
purchase of banks or large corporations.3
Moreover, it is in this type of contract where pre-contractual agreements take place. They
constitute an important stage where the parties have the opportunity to discuss, learn and
discover the advantages and disadvantages of the business. It is in this stage where the parties
gather the confidential information of the business such as technical studies, production,
marketability of the products, and industrial standards. In this stage, the party interested in the
purchase of the business or company may invest a large amount of money as well as time in
order to get the information required to make an informed decision in respect to the possible
offer and later the conclusion of the contract. These pre-negotiations are called in different civil
legislations “ Tratos preliminaries” , “ Conversaciones Previas”  or “ Tratativas” .
Colombian legislation regulates the liability of pre-contractual agreements under Article 863 of
the Commercial Code, which provides that the parties shall act in good faith and without fault
during pre-contractual negotiations, and that in case of the violation of this provision, the party
at fault will be liable for damages caused to the innocent party.
Moreover, Article 872 of the Colombia Commercial Code provides that the celebration and
execution of the contract shall be in good faith. As indicated above, this concept has been
extended to the pre-contractual stage. Therefore, the parties have the duty to act in good faith
2 Gabriel Escovar Sanin, Negocios Civiles y Comerciales Tomo II, Dike 379 (1994).
3 Id. at 380.
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and without fault, which means that it is not sufficient that they are convinced that they are
acting according to the principles of good faith but that they are acting without negligence.
Additionally, Article 830 of the Colombia Commercial Code indicates that a person who
abuses his rights and harms another would be liable for the damages caused to the innocent
party. This is called “ Abuso del Derecho”  and it is one of the principles that inspired pre-
contractual liability. Finally, Article 831 is related to the principle of unjust enrichment.
Accordingly, the importance of the pre-contractual stage is not only related to the protection of
the parties against negligence, unfair practices and unjust enrichment, but it is fundamental to
the interpretation of the contract. Therefore, the initial acts, agreements, and negotiations
between the parties tending toward the celebration and culmination of the contract will
indicate their intention to enter into a future contract. For that reason the Colombia Civil
Code in Article 1618 indicates that, once the intention of the contracting parties is known,
such intention prevails over the literal interpretation of provisions of the contract.
In Colombia, pre-contractual liability does not require the element of “ culpa”  (fault), it only
requires the arbitrary rupture of the negotiations; even if such rupture by the contractual party
is without fault it will generate liability. The fundamental point is that it goes against
commercial equity and good faith. Therefore, the law should not permit one to unfairly
withdraw from pre-contractual negotiations without legal consequences in situations in which a
party has invested a large amount of money and work searching the business. The importance
here it is to protect the parties’ patrimonial interest because the frustration of pre-contractual
negotiations can caused the same or superior damages as those cause by the breach of the
executed contract.
Colombian’s Supreme Court has studied the implication of liability for pre-contractual
agreements and has encountered some difficulties in the interpretation of the limits of liability
and how best to frame the appropriate level of responsibility. The Court’s major concern is not
to contravene the ambit of freedom of contract.
In addition, the Colombia Supreme Court had held that the compensation for damages caused
by one contractual party to the other at the pre-contractual stage is divided into two different
categories as follows: “ daño emergente”  and “ lucro cesante.”
“ Daño emergente”  had been defined as the harm suffered by the injured party for the loss of
expenses and financial inversions made during the pre-contractual stage. Colombia’s legislation
considered that these expenses constitute a negative contractual interest for the abrupt and
unjustified rupture of pre-contractual negotiations. In consequence, this interest is limited to
the amount of the loss of expenses.
This negative interest does not include the expectation interest that the party could have if the
contract would have been executed. Moreover, “ daño emergente”  includes the monetary
correction.
The interest that emerges from the breach of a valid executed contract is known as “ interés de
cumplimiento”  or “ interés positivo”  (positive interests) because its goal is to put the contracting
party in the same financial situation that he would have been if the contract had been
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performed. The positive interest is the equivalent to the American expectation interest for the
breach of a contract. However, the negative interest, which is also know as an “ interés de
confianza”  (trust interest), is oriented to compensate the injured party for the loss of expenses
that he incurred during pre-contractual negotiation as a consequence of his reliance on the
other contracting party interest to continue with the negotiations to finally execute a contract.
The negative interest is similar to the American reliance interest for the breach of contract but
at a pre-contractual stage.
According to Pedro Lafont Pianetta, who is a Colombian Supreme Court Justice, the negative
interest compensates for the loss of expenses, material and moral damage that result from the
frustration of pre-contractual agreements. The goal is to bring the injured party to the same
financial situation that he was in before he started with pre-contractual negotiations.4
Moreover, Gabriel Escovar Sanin indicated that the negative interest has two aspects:
1. The necessity to repair the harm caused by the reliance on the other contractual
party, for the trust in her promise
2. The necessity to support and encourage trust and good faith in commercial
negotiations.5
The understanding of these two aspects is fundamental for the integral interpretation and
understanding of the primary goal of pre-contractual liability and its compensation system.
Moreover, the “ lucro cesante”  is defined as a lost of the opportunities that the injured party
suffered on reliance of pre-contractual negotiations. In Colombia this is call “ perdida del chance”
(loss of a chance). This situation is presented when an innocent party refused to enter into the
negotiations of another contract offered by a third party in reliance of the on-going negotiations
with the guilty party. In such case the party at fault has to pay for the loss of opportunities
suffered by the injured party.
Colombia Supreme Court Justice Alejandro Bonivento has indicated that the compensation for
the breach of pre-contractual negotiations is composed of the “ daño emergente”  and “ lucro
cesante” , therefore both interests have to be calculated in order to determine the final
compensation.6
However, there was a polemic in relation to the amount of damages that should be paid as a
consequence of the “ lucro cesante” . The Supreme Court has held that this interest should be
measured by the loss of profit that the injured party suffered for the loss of opportunities. For
instance, the losses of profits caused when the party refuse to accept another contract proposed
by a third party at the same time that he was involved in the negotiations of the frustrated
contract.7
4 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentnecia de Junio 27 de 1990, M.P: Dr. Pedro Lafont Pianetta.
5 Sanin, supra note 1, at 394
6 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentencia de Noviembre 23 de 1989, M.P: Dr. Jose Alejandro Bonivento Fernandez
7 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentencia de Noviembre 23 de 1989, M.P: Dr. Jose Alejandro Bonivento Fernandez
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Finally, pre-contractual liability in Colombia seems to be similar to the reliance interest, and the
American doctrine of promissory estoppel in contracts. The concepts of “ daño emergente”  and
“ lucro cesante”  have the same inspiration as the principle of the reliance interest: to place the
injured party in the same situation as he was before the contract was made. However, the main
difference is that such liability is generated in Colombia from the first negotiations and
agreements between the parties in pre-contractual stages where there is a tacit agreement
between the parties to act in accordance with good faith, fair business, diligence and loyalty.
Also, in Colombia there are three stages in the formation of a contract as follows: the first is
pre-contractual agreements or negotiations, the second, is the contractual stage and the last is
the post-contractual stage. Each of these stages generates liability to the parties in case of breach.
C. Hypothetical Examples to Illustrate How Pre-contractual Liability is Applied in Colombia
The following are some examples of the situations where pre-contractual liability occurs as
defined in Colombia.
a. A company accepted an engineer as a capital partner in the company. The engineer in
reliance on the word of the company’s President and CEO proceeded to sell some of his
properties at a lower price than the commercial price because he wanted to collect the amount
of money that he had to pay to become a partner. Also, at the same time, he quit his job in
another company. However, a few hours before the execution of the document that recognized
him as a partner, the company notified him that they changed the qualifications of admission
of the possible partner, and under these new requirements it was impossible for him to become
a partner of the company8.
In this case, the company, even without the existence of a contract, should be responsible for
the damages caused to the innocent party because in reliance on their word he left his job and
proceeded to sell his properties to respond for the payment that the company required him to
make as a capital partner. Here, one party unfairly raised in the other party a hope that a
contract will be made.
b. Juan was an old and outstanding client of a bank. He asked for a loan of $500,000.00
dollars (This sum was lower than of the prior sums loaned to him by the bank.) He needed this
money for the purchase of some equipment for his company. In compliance with the prior
practices with the bank, and the bank holding his mortgages, and the bank’s manager’s oral
confirmation of acceptance of the loan, he proceeded to negotiate for the industrial equipment
with the seller and signed a promise of purchase. After the negotiation, he went to the bank to
pick up the money for the payment of the equipment. However, he was informed that the
credit committee declined his petition for the loan due to a restriction on loans. Juan’s
financial situation and payments to the institution had been outstanding and did not change
from the prior times when he asked the bank for loans. As a consequence, of the negative
8 Sanin, Supra note 1, at 423.
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actions of the bank Juan had to pay the amount of a penal clause and suffer enormous
detriments in the development and progress of his company.9
In this example, the bank’s manager made a promise to Juan and broke that promise. Therefore,
the bank under the law on pre-contractual agreements, is responsible for the damages caused for
their negative action on the loan. The bank’s manager knew that, in accordance with prior
practices and dealings with Juan, he would commence the negotiations for the equipment and
the bank manager’s word of acceptance would give Juan a green light to even sign a promise of
purchase. Juan acted in reliance on prior practices and the manager’s word. In this case, as in the
first example, there was a hope that a future contract would be made.
D. Brief Comparison Between Pre-contractual Liability as Applied in Colombia and under American
Law
The first example that I gave to illustrate the application of pre-contractual agreements under
the Colombian legislation is similar in a way to the case of Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. where the
plaintiff worked for a long time for the defendant and in consideration of his years of services
and in gratitude for his hard work, the company made a resolution to recognized an extra
payment for the plaintiff upon his retirement (Two hundred dollars for life). The plaintiff, in
reliance on this promise, retired. The company made the promised payments for some time
until they decided to stop the payments arguing that a promise to make a gift is not binding
without consideration and in their case the payment was only a promise and not a standing
contract. The court held that in the instant case the plaintiff acted on reliance upon the
promise contained in the resolution, and this therefore created an enforceable contract under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. (See § 90 of the Restatement Second of Contracts.) Here
the plaintiff, in reliance on the promise, retired. The defendant should have reasonably
expected that the plaintiff would act in reliance on their promise; in other words, the defendant
induced the plaintiff to retire. Consequently, the court ordered the payments for life.10
It is imperative to mention the similarities between the concepts of reliance interest and
promissory estoppel in American law and the effects of concept of pre-contractual liability in
Colombia. First, under the concepts of reliance interest and the promissory estoppel, the
contractual liability arises when one of the parties makes a promise to the other contractual
party as a part of the contract. These two concepts presuppose the existence of a valid contract
and, as a consequence of it, one party changes his position during the contractual stage in
reliance upon the other party promises to perform the contract. Whereas in Colombia pre-
contractual liability is imposed as a consequence of the reliance of one party on the other
party’s promise or inducement to believe that it would be a probable conclusion of a future
contract, this liability is generated as a consequence of the rupture of pre-contractual
negotiations and the detriment suffered by one party due to the other side’s inducement to
believe in the possibility of a future contract. Therefore, this kind of liability does not suppose
the breach of a valid contract, merely the breach or rupture of the negotiations.
9 Sanin, Supra note 1, at 424 .
10 Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. 322 S.W. 2d 163 (MO. Ct. App.1959)
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In general. the American legal system does not provide for the concept of culpa in contrahendo or
pre-contractual liability. However, Puerto Rico has contemplated the doctrine of the culpa in
contrahendo in its legislation as a consequence of its civil law system. In contrast, the common
law states do not recognize the fundamentals of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo and pre-
contractual liability.
As I have mentioned before, Colombian’s legislation statutorily regulates the figures of culpa in
contrahendo and, specifically, the liability of pre-contractual agreements.
Colombia’s legislation provides remedies for reliance where there has been an arbitrary rupture
of pre-contractual negotiations. In consequence, the guilty party will be obligated to pay for the
damages cause to the innocent party, who in reliance of the other’s word and behavior invests
time and money in the initial pre-negotiations stage in order to know the details and gather the
information required to make an informed decision before the celebration of the contract.
With respect to the doctrine of the promissory estoppel, Günter Kühne has stated that
philosophically it was developed as a consequence of the insufficiency of reliance produce by
the bargain and the exchange concept consideration:
“ In the United States the promissory estoppel took over the tract to make up for the reliance
deficit produced by the bargain and the exchange philosophy of the consideration principle. It
became an instrument to enforce gratuitous promises where one, relying on the promise,
changed his position and incurred financial losses.” 11
The concept of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is similar to the conception of pre-
contractual liability in Colombia in the fact that the main inspiration is to avoid unjust
enrichment, to promote fair business practices, and to imposed responsibility on the party who
either intentionally or unintentionally made a promise to another and had reason to know that
the other party will act in a certain way in reliance on his promise.
The difference is that promissory estoppel operates on a contractual stage, in other words,
where a valid contract has been made, and to lock in the offer in a bid case once the contractor
has notified the subcontractor that he won the contract.
However, pre-contractual agreements do not require the formation of a valid contract, only the
pre-negotiations of it whether or not they come to fruition. Pre-contractual agreements do not
require the complete meeting of the minds as is required to obtained relief under the concept
of promissory estoppel and the reliance interest in American law.
Pre-contractual agreements only required that the party seeking recovery had reason to conclude
from the other party’s conduct that a future contract will be made. Here, what is punished is
the careless inducement in reliance and the late rupture of negotiations and frustration of
11 Kühne, Günter, Promissory estoppel and culpa in contrahendo, 10 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law, Tel Aviv
282 (1990).
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reliance investment. Consequently, the main point is to recover for the reliance invested during
the dealing and the recovery for the economic loss.12
Günter Kuhne indicates that in the case of culpa in contrahendo and pre-contractual liability, it is
possible to conclude that liability of the party is recognized based on two elements:
a. “ Violation of a pre-contractual duty, which is the duty in regard to the contractual
process before a break-off. (The duty is not to rupture negotiations for other than
valid reasons, so the break-of itself caused liability.)
b. The inducement of reliance action to the detriment of the other party. One party
changes his position in reliance of the other one promise and behavior.” 13
In respect to the liability imposed through these two elements, it is clear that the parties owed
to each other the obligation to act in good faith since the beginning of the negotiations. It is
also reasonable to expect the reliance of the other party in the negotiations in changing his
position to investigate and gather the prudence information in respect to the business.
Consequently, the party might hire attorneys, accountants, engineers and any kind of
consultants that he might require to understand and to inform him with respect to the business
in negotiation. Therefore, the blameworthy party will be liable for the arbitrary rupture of the
negotiations due to the investment made by the other party on reliance on the possible
contract, based on the behavior and promises of the other party. In conclusion, it is possible to
understand that the liability imposed through these two elements was the natural consequence
of its breach.
Moreover, another difference between the Colombian’ legislation and the American law in
respect to pre-contractual agreements is that the element of good faith is not require in America
in pre-contractual stages. In other words, it is not extended to the negotiations. There is not a
specific duty to bargain in good faith but there is a duty to be performed in good faith
obligation, which is imposed during the contractual stage. Consequently, the Uniform
Commercial Code requires merchants to perform in good faith and fair dealing. For instance,
in the case of a merchant, the good faith element imposes on him the obligation to observe
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade and to perform with respect of
such standards.14 While in Colombia, the Commercial Code imposes an obligation on the
contractual parties to observe good faith during the pre-contractual stage, Therefore, the
blameworthy party would be liable for his breach of such duty. The fundamental point of such
provision is that during the pre-contractual stage the parties engaged in the negotiations build
between them relationships based on trust similar to the ones that arise in the contractual stage,
so they will have to comply with a high standard of care.
In conclusion, pre-contractual liability in Colombia has a high importance in the contractual
relations between the parties and therefore the Commercial and Civil Code regulates it
extensively. Its goal is to promote good faith and fair dealing during all the contractual stages
and as well as to prevent the unjust enrichment of one of the parties to the detriment of the
12 Id. at 282
13 Kühne, Supra note10, at 288
14 Kessler, Friedrich/Fine, Edith, Culpa in contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract: A
comparative Study, Harvard Law Review, 1964. Pg 408.
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other party. The goal of the concept of pre-contractual liability is to restore the damages
suffered by one party in reliance on the blameworthy party.
During the negotiation of pre-contractual agreements, some obligations and rights are
generated to the parties. The main obligation is to act in good faith, meaning that the parties
have to initiate the negotiations with the intention to reach an agreement, and to withdraw as
soon as possible, before the other party, in reliance of the negotiations, invests in the research
of the business. Also, good faith requires the obligation of reserve which means that
information with respect to the business and financial situation of one of the parties ought not
to be disclosed if it is confidential. Finally, it requires the obligation of custody and
conservation of all the material that has been given to the parties in the course of the
negotiations. The withdrawal itself does not cause the liability. There has to be some kind of
unfair act such as not intending to reach an agreement and omitting to communicate the
determination to he other party, not disclosing trustworthy information, or continuing the
negotiations after realizing that the contract will never be concluded.
III. A BRIEF VIEW OF PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY UNDER THE CISG
We cannot find any provision in the CISG that specifically regulates pre-contractual liability. In
this respect, the CISG is silent. However, the application of this concept can nevertheless be
inferred from the CISG’s general principles, from its provisions and from its interpretation as a
whole. The first approach is to look at article 7(1), which addresses the international character
of the Convention and its promotion of the principle of good faith in international trade. One
then turns to article 7(2) which indicates that, for matters governed by the Convention, but not
expressly settled in it, the correct approach is to interpret the matter according to the general
principles of the Convention, where such principles are present. Article 8 of the CISG is also
highly relevant.
A. Applicability of Pre-Contractual Agreements under the CISG According to Article 7 and Article 8
In my view, in order to have a full understanding of the application of pre-contractual liability
under the CISG, one must review the legislative history of article 7 which refers to the good
faith principal. I will emphasize in its importance.
According to the legislative records of the Vienna Diplomatic Conference at which the CISG
was promulgated, there was a lack of consensus as to the meaning of the principle of good faith
provided in article 7. The following are some of the views that were discussed in respect to the
inclusion of good faith in international trade:
“ Colloquy at Diplomatic Conference on Proposal to provide a more specific reference to good faith
(“ Article [7] [is] not the appropriate place for a reference to a principal of major importance in
international trade relations. A separate article [is] required.”  Proposal rejected”  Comments by
delegates, some regarding a good faith requirement as present without such a separate article; some
not wanting such an article because it would document the existence of a good faith requirement
applicable to a contracting parties. OR 257-259,paras. 40-56 [OR=Official Records of the
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United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna 10 March-
11 April 1980, A/CONF. 97/19]” 15
The draft of article 6 that was presented in 1978 was approved as article 7(1) of the official text
of the CISG.
The major modifications proposed were presented by Italy and Norway as follows:
“ [Italy (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.59):
Delete the words “ and the observance of the good faith in international trade”  (cf. in this respect
the proposed new article 6 [became CISG article 7] ter) and add new sentence:
“ questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settle therein
shall be settle in conformity with the general principles on which this Convention is based or, in
the absence of such principles, by taking account of the national law of each of the parties.” ]
[Add a new article 6 [became article 7] ter to read as follows:
“ In the formation [interpretation] and performance of a contract of sale the parties shall observe
the principles of the good faith and international co-operation.” ]
{Norway (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.28):
Delete the words:
“ and the observance of the good faith in international trade”
Article [6] [became article 7]” 16
During the discussions, Mr. Bonell, who was a member of the Italian delegation indicated that
an inclusion of a provision regulating the observance of good faith principle was required in the
CISG. Therefore, he supported and proposed the adoption of a separate provision for the
regulation of a major principle of good faith. In addition, he stated that his delegation
proposed to add a reference to “ international cooperation”  with the intention to clarify that
only those aspects of good faith that were internationally acceptable would apply to the
interpretation of the principles under the CISG.17
Mr. Rognlien, of Norway, stated that the reference to the principle of good faith should be
transferred from article 6 to article 7. He also indicated that the observance of good faith was
related to the contract between the parties not to the interpretation of the provisions of the
Convention. Therefore, he considered that the reference to good faith should be transferred
from article 6 to article 7 (which become article 8 (3) of the CISG). He disagreed with the
inclusion of the reference to the international cooperation proposed by Italy.18
Miss O’Flynn who represented United Kingdom stated that there was no need to add a new
article for the provision of the good faith as it was proposed by Italy. She indicated that the
15 Article 7 Colloquy, Interpretation of the Convention. Points of view expressed at Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, Colloquy on issue related to a good faith: proposal to add to CISG a version of concept of culpa in
contrahendo (pre-contractual liability): proposal rejected [Official Records 294-295, paras. 77-87] (1980)
16 Id. at 294-295
17 Id.
18 Id..
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meaning of the article involved an uncertain interpretation, the principles of the good faith
were not defined, and there was no provision for the application of sanctions that would be
applied as a consequence of the failure of one party to act in good faith. In conclusion, she did
not support the Italian proposal.19
Finally, Mr. Allan Farnsworth, representing the United States, noted that he had a preference
for the existing text because the Italian proposal with respect to the application and
interpretation of the good faith in an international context was uncertain and dangerous.20
The issue related to the prohibition of the parties from departing from their obligation to act in
good faith was debated during the discussion related to the principal of good faith. A Canadian
proposal read as follows:
“ Change article 5 [became CISG article 6] to read as follows:
(Canada (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.10):
“ (1) The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 11 [became
CISG article 12], derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. However, except were
the parties have wholly excluded this Convention, the obligation of good faith, diligence and
reasonable care prescribe by this Convention may not be excluded by agreement, but the parties
may by agreement determinate the standards by which the performance of such obligations are to
be measure if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.]” 21
With respect to this issue, Mr. Farnsworth indicated that he did not support the Canadian
proposal because it will impose a general obligation of good faith. The majority of the
committee was against the Canadian proposal therefore it was not approved.
Finally, the committees discussed a proposal specifically related to pre-contractual liability. The
delegates from the German Democratic Republic proposed that a new article on this subject be
added to Part II of the Convention. (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.95). The following are some of the
comments with respect to this proposal:22
“ 78. Mr. PLUNKETT (Ireland) asked whether the proposal envisaged that compensation would
be payable even if no contract had been conclude, or if a contract had been conclude, whether it
should be payable for something other than a breach of contract.
“ 79. Mr. MASKOW (German Democratic Republic) replied that it was the essence of his
proposal that compensation for expenses could be claim even if there were no contract.
“ 80. Mr. BONELL (Italy) strongly supported the proposal. His delegation had already submitted
a proposal along similar lines. The existing text of the Convention did not take sufficiently into
account cases where no contract was concluded but the parties had engaged in detailed
negotiations at the pre-contractual stage. Such cases needed regulation because of the risk that one
of the parties might abuse its position and act in such a way as to damage the interest of the other
party. He thought the drafting of the proposal could be improved, notably by the deletion of the
phrase “ in the course of the preliminary negotiations” , and also by the inclusion of a phrase to
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Official records pp 257-259
22 Id. at 294-295.
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cover the situation in which the party had not necessarily had expenses, but had suffered damages.
He suggested that an ad hoc working group be set up to produce an agreed text.
“ 81. Mr. SCHLECHTRIEM (Federal Republic of Germany) sympathized with the object of the
proposal but considered it much too far-reaching. Such a general clause might change some of the
solutions of the draft, e.g., the provisions dealing with the obligations of the parties or with the
revocability of the offer. It would touch on the problem of form requirements and would also affect
matters outside the scope of the Convention such as the avoidance of the contract for errors, or the
authority of agents.
“ 82. Mr. BENNETT (Australia) said that he had great difficulty with the proposal. It referred to
a failure in duty to take reasonable care, a notion that was not found anywhere else in the
Convention. It was not clear what was the standard of reasonable care that was envisaged. The
problem was an important one and not merely one of drafting.”
As it is reflected in the reading of the opinions, the proposal for pre-contractual liability was
highly objected to by members if the committee and was not agreed on.
However, in my opinion, the failure of the approval of the committee to adopt this provision
on the regulation of pre-contractual liability under the CSIG was the result of a lack of
understanding of the concept by the common law delegations. As I indicated in the first
chapter of this article, pre-contractual liability has not been recognized as a part of the
contractual law at common law jurisdictions. I think that their major fear is to contravene the
principal of freedom of contract. Conversely, the position of the common law jurisdictions, in
their effort to protect freedom of contract, is lacking in protection for the contractual parties
during pre-contractual negotiations. It is my view that this is a dangerous approach because
during pre-contractual negotiations the damages that can result by the unjustified withdraw of
the negotiations can be major or equal to the damages caused by the breach of the contract.
Therefore, in order to avoid unjust enrichment and honor the principles of good faith and fair
dealing from the beginning of the negotiations of a probable contract, the concept of pre-
contractual liability should be regarded as a part of contract law.
In addition to its discussion at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, the concept of pre-
contractual liability had been discussed earlier in 1977 at the 9th session where the UNCITRAL
Working Group presented its finished draft of the “ Formation of the Contract.”  The draft
included the requirement that fair dealing and good faith had to be observed by the parties
during the course of the formation of the contract. The German Democratic Republic
suggested that a third paragraph be added to the proposal of Hungary (as indicated above such
proposal was raised and objected in the Vienna Conference).
In addition, the German Democratic Republic maintained that the observance of fair dealing
and good faith was required from the parties during the course of formation of the contract
and, if during the preparation and formation of the contract one of the parties violated their
duties of customer care the other party had the right to claim compensation for the economic
loss.23
23 UNCITRAL Yearbook IX, (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 pp 66-67; Honnold Documentary History pp 298-299.
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Furthermore, for some of the drafters the concept of good faith and fair dealing was considered
a moral obligation. Therefore, it was highly important that they elevated these principals to the
stage of a legal obligation. However, they were concerned that the application of such principles
to particular transactions might not lead to the development of a uniformed and coherent case
law in international trade because each national court might be influenced by its own legal
traditions and beliefs. To conclude, it was the majority opinion that the proposals for pre-
contractual liability under the CISG were properly rejected. The view that prevails is that pre-
contractual liability is not part of the scope of the Convention. However, there is a minority
opinion to the effect that, even though the CISG does not include an express provision dealing
with pre-contractual liability, it will be possible for the tribunals to impose its application by the
interpretation of the general provision of observance of good faith in international trade and
the interpretation of the principals of the Convention as a whole. Respect to this point, Bonell
has noted:24
“ The fact that CISG does not have a provision expressly dealing with the pre-contractual liability
of the parties for theirs conduct during the negotiations does not necessarily mean that the issue
fall outside the scope of the Convention. In fact, pre-contractual liability could simply be -- to use
the language of Article 7 —  one of those questions concerning matters governed by [the] Convention
which are not expressly settled in it… . Issues which are outside the scope of the Convention
continue to be governed by domestic law while, in the case of simple lacuna, the solution has to be
found primarily within the Convention itself, i.e., in conformity with the general principles on
which it is based, and only in the absence of such principles, may resort be had to the law
applicable by virtue of the relevant conflict of law rules (Cf. Article 7(2))… .”
I agree with Professor Bonell. It is clear that pre-contractual liability should not be considered
outside the scope of the CISG. Its application can be possible through the interpretation of the
Convention as a whole and in conformity with the application of its general principles. From
the analysis of the principles of good faith, and fair dealing in conjunction with the
interpretation of the conduct and intention of the parties, it is possible to establish the
existence of a pre-contractual liability under the CISG.
Additionally, the application of the principles of good faith and fair dealing has also been
recognized by the UNIDROIT Principles. Article 1.7 regulates the general application of the
principal of good faith and fair dealing in international trade. Furthermore, the article indicates
that the parties cannot “ exclude or limit such obligation.” 25
Moreover, Article 2.1.15 which rules on negotiations in bad faith provides:26
A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement.
However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable for the losses
caused to the other party.
24 Bonnell “ Formation of Contracts and Pre-Contractual Liability Under the Vienna Convention on International
Sale of Goods” Formation of Contracts and pre-contractual liability (ICC Publishing Pub. No. 440/9: 1990) pp 167-171.
25 Steven J. Burton and Melvin A. Eisenberg, Contract Law: Selected Sources Materials, UNIDROIT Pinciples,Thomson
West p381 (2006)
26 Id. at 384.
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It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations when intending not
to reach an agreement with the other party.”
According to Rodrigo Novoa, it is possible for the courts to find that the adoption of pre-
contractual duty to bargain in good faith under the UNIDROIT could be extended to the
CISG because the main purpose of the UNIDROIT principles is to provide guidelines for the
interpretation and application of the uniform law instruments on international commercial
contracts such as the CISG. Therefore, it is probable that the adoption of the pre-contractual
duty to bargain in good faith by the UNDROIT principles might persuade a court that this duty
is also present under the CISG.27
Moreover, Shani Salama considered that article 7(2) of the CISG provides an interpretation
tool of the Convention. Therefore, when the courts are filling the gaps encountered in the
interpretation of a matter that is not settled in the Convention like the pre-contractual liability
they should look at article 7(2) and interpret such matters within the general principles that
inspired the Convention. According to Salama the interpretation under article 7(2) required
the use of hierarchy methods of interpretation. She indicates that the first approach by a court
when it is filling the gaps under the CISG is to look at the provisions and the general principles
that inspired the Convention even if the matter is not expressively settled. Second, if the matter
is excluded of the scope of the convention, for instance, the liability of the seller for death and
personal injury (art 5 CISG), such matter should be resolved according to the rules applicable
under the private international law and not the CISG. In consequence, article 7(2) would be
inapplicable.28
Furthermore, she emphasized that the scholars have not been clear in respect to the
interpretation of the definition of “ general principles that inspired the CISG. She noted:
“ The definition of “ general principles upon which the Convention is based”  falls short of receiving
any clear interpretation in the scholarly works. Reference is made to these principles in article 7(2)
without further explanation. Jeffrey Hartwing writes that the “ general principles are to be derived
from the Convention’s own provisions” . Moreover, Professor Honnold writes that a “ particular
general principal must be moored to premises that underlie specific provisions of the convention.” 29
In addition, Salama indicates that the interpretation of the general principles of the
Convention should be broader then just limiting their construction only to the general
principles that derive from the Convention. Moreover, such construction should not even be
limited to the intent of the drafters. The interpretation of the general principles should be
broader according to the international character of the Convention article 7(1). In
consequence, Salama considered that the courts should look carefully and extensively to the
general principles of the Convention because it is a living body capable of changes and
adaptation to the new commercial transactions in international commerce. Thus the
interpretation of the general principles of the Convention should follow the changes and
27 Rodrigo Novoa, Culpa in contrahendo: A Comparative Law Study: Chilean Law and the United Nations Convention On
Contracts For The International Sale Of Goods (CISG),22 Ariz. J. Int’L & Comp. L. 583. p 611 (2005)
28 Shani Salama, Pragmatic Responses to Interpretive Impediments: Article 7 of the CISG, An Inter-American Application, 28
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review p 7-8 (Fall 2006)
29 Id at 8
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transactions in international trade. This point of view is consistent with the regulation provided
in article 7(2) because one of its goals is to resolve not expressly regulated matters like those that
will arise in the future. To conclude, she also supports the view of Professor Guilmard that
“ promotes that the use of principles of the UNDROIT and PECL as a source of general
principles in art 7(2).” 30
I really like Salama’s approach regarding the interpretation of Art 7(2). As I stated before, the
pre- contractual liability is within the scope of the CISG .Therefore, following Salama’s theory,
if a court has to decide a case on pre-contractual liability the first step for the court is to look at
the general principles that inspired the CISG because it constitutes and unsettled matter. Thus
the interpretation and regulation of the pre-contractual liability will be possible through its
principles. Consequently, there is no need to refer and resolve the case according to the private
international law. Furthermore, as Salama stated, the interpretation of the general principles of
the CISG should be broader according to its international character and not only limited to
those derived from the Convention. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the principles
of the UNDROIT and PECL constitute a source of the general principles referred in art 7 (2)
and therefore the adoption of pre-contractual duty to bargain in good faith under the
UNIDROIT could be extended to the CISG.
Finally, it is imperative to indicate that interpretation of the conduct and intention of the
parties is fundamental in the analysis of the application of the pre-contractual liability under the
CISG. Article 8 Provides:31
“ (1) For the purposes of the application of this Convention statements made by and other conduct
of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not
have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party
are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as
the other party would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had,
due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations,
any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties.”
From the reading of Article 8 of the CISG, it is clear that this provision is not related to the
interpretation of the Convention but to the interpretation of the parties’ statements,
intentions, conducts, usages and practices in light of an international contract of sale of goods.
There are two tests that apply in the interpretation of the party’s statements and conduct. The
first is the subjective test which indicates that the statements and conducts of the parties are to
be understood according with its intent (Article 8(1)) “ where the other party knew or could not have
been unaware what that intent was.” The second is the objective test, which refers to the
understanding of the statement and conduct by a reasonable person under the same
30 Id.
31 Burton and Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 350.
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circumstances (Article 8 (2)). The objective test will be applicable when the other party neither
knew or nor could have been aware of the intent.
In reference to this article, I would like to emphasize the importance of the interpretation of
the conduct, statements and intentions of the parties when they are dealing with pre-
contractual negotiations because they will lead one of the parties to rely on and conclude the
serious intentions of the other contractual party to a contract. Therefore, the party in reliance
on the other party’s statements and behaviors will study, research and invest time and money
learning the benefits and disadvantages of the future contract. Consequently, if one of the
parties abruptly withdraws from the negotiations without justification, it should be liable for
the damages caused to the other contractual party.
B. Hypothetical Case to Illustrate the Application of Pre-Contractual Liability Under the CISG.
The following is a hypothetical example that will help to illustrate the application of pre-
contractual liability under the CISG:
Wine Co. is a vineyard company located in Italy. The Company is selling its entire production
for 2006. The wine is stored in a warehouse located in a distant place. On January 2, 2006,
Wine Co. sent information to all its clients stating that it was offering its entire production in
the vineyard for 2006 but that the price could not be lower than US $6 per bottle, and its
entire production was approximately three million bottles. In addition, Wine Company advised
that clients interested in buying the production would have to respond by communication sent
to Piero Monestier, CEO of the company no later then January 30, 2006 and that a final
contract should be signed by March 30, 2006, after the inspection and testing of the product by
interested buyers. The inspection was programmed for February 16, 2006. Three South
American firms expressed interest: Concha Co. from Colombia; Toro from Chile and Tinto
from Argentina. These three clients traveled to Italy for the inspection. The inspection was held
for four days and the clients brought specialists to determine the quality of the wine. The
contract was to be awarded to the best proposal twenty days after of the inspection. However,
Wine Co. informed its clients ten days after the inspection its refusal to continue with the
negotiations. Wine Co. did not give any specific reason to its clients. The company only
indicated that due to a policy of the company the negotiation was canceled. Wine Co. knew
since January 30, that the negotiation would be canceled due to their contractual obligation
with an Italian client. However, the Company did not stop the negotiations and continued with
them until the inspection and then, only a few days before the award of the contract, withdrew
its proposal. All the countries involved in the negotiations had their relevant places of business
in countries that subscribed to the CISG. The damages caused to the clients included the loss
of out-of-pocket expenses and the loss of opportunities because they refrained from negotiating
with other providers due to the ongoing negotiations with Wine Co.
To establish a case under the concept of pre-contractual liability, four elements are required:32
32 Novoa, Supra note 27, at 583
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1. “ Preliminary negotiations;
2. Breach of the duty to bargain in good faith;
3. Causation in fact; and
4. Compensable damages.”
The hypothetical case meets these requirements. There were preliminary negotiations, (the
requirement of prior inspection of the product and the posterior communication of the offer
after 20 days of the inspection), Wine Co. without justification and in bad faith withdrew the
negotiations and, as a consequence of the rupture of the negotiations, its clients suffered
damages in reliance on its statement and conduct. Wine Co. promoted the preliminary
negotiations and did not withdraw the negotiations, as soon as it found out that such a contract
would not be concluded. The Company continued with the inspection and let the clients invest
money in their travel expenses, salary of experts and caused them to miss other opportunities.
In situations as illustrated in this hypothetical case the application of pre-contractual liability
under the CISG should be possible. First, the CISG promotes the general principals of good
faith and fair dealing. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the parties, since the beginning
of the negotiation, have the obligation to bargain in good faith and the breach of such
obligation will render legal consequences for the damages caused by the breach. Also, it is
reasonable to conclude that a party, in reliance on the other party’s promises, statements or
conduct, will proceed with the due diligence that was required to obtain the conclusion of the
contract. For instance, in the hypothetical example any reasonable person in the same situation
would have understood that Wine Co. had a serious intention to conclude the negotiations
and award the contract to the best offer (Article 8). The parties would never incur such
investment in money and work if they did not have an understanding that the proposal sent by
Wine Company was serious. Therefore, the intention of the parties was clear. The Wine
Company showed an intention to conclude a contract. It would be unfair to conclude that the
parties should pay for the cost of the inspection and travel because Wine Company required
them to execute the inspection as a condition precedent before the awarding of the contract
under circumstances in which. Wine Company knew its intention to withdraw the negotiations
but failed to communicate this determination in time. Wine Company did not act according
the general principles of good faith and fair dealing that inspire the CISG.
Conversely, I would like to think of the outcome of this case under the analysis of the majority
view that held that pre-contractual liability is outside of the scope of the CISG. In their analysis
they will probably indicate that the domestic law would apply instead of the CISG because the
Convention is silent to this respect.
In my opinion, regarding pre-contractual liability as outside the scope of the CISG will lead to
uncertainty and ambiguous interpretations and outcomes because the gap will be fulfilled
according to the provisions of the domestic laws. Therefore, if a pre-contractual liability case is
decided in common law jurisdictions, it is likely that the parties will not be allowed to recover
damages for the unjustified withdraw of pre-contractual negotiations. Conversely, if the same
case is resolved by a judge in the civil law jurisdiction, the innocent party will likely be allowed
to recover the damages caused in reliance on the other party’s intention to conclude a future
contract. In consequence, the innocent party will be compensated for the cost of expenses and
the lost of opportunities suffered during pre-contractual negotiations.
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I believe that the application of domestic law in cases of pre-contractual liability in international
contracts would infringe the major principals and goals of the CISG because it will be a lack of
unity in the interpretation and outcomes in this matter. Therefore, this conclusion would not
honor the uniformity and unity that the Convention pursues.
C. Comparison Between the Application of Pre-Contractual Liability Under the CISG and
Colombian Domestic Law
Colombian legislation regulated pre-contractual liability under the Civil and Commercial Code.
In contrast, the CISG is silent respect to this matter. The majority of the scholars opine that
pre-contractual liability is not within the scope of the CISG. However, I believe that pre-
contractual liability is regulated under the CISG and is not outside its scope.
As I indicated before, it is possible to infer its application through the interpretation of its
general principles and provisions as a whole. In consequence, the application of pre-contractual
liability is possible under the interpretation of the regulations provided in articles 7 and 8 of
the CISG.
Article 7 regulates the international character of the Convention and provides for the
promotion of good faith in international trade. In addition, this article indicates that where a
matter is governed by the Convention but not expressly settled in it, the correct approach is to
resolve the matter according to its general principles, where such principles are present.
Similarly, Article 863 of the Colombian Commercial Code sets forth the obligation of the
contracting parties to act in good faith and without fault during pre-contractual negotiations
and provides that the failure to comply with this obligation will cause the liability of the party at
fault.
In addition, Article 872 of the Commercial Code indicates that the celebration and execution
of the contracts shall be in good faith.
Moreover, the CISG in Article 8 states that the intention, statements and conduct of the
contractual parties should prevail in the interpretation of the contract.
In this aspect, the CISG is also similar to the Colombian legislation because Article 1618 of the
Colombian Civil Code states that, once the intention of the contractual party is known, that
intention prevails against the literal interpretation of the provisions of the contract.
Finally, both legislations will award damages in reliance to the innocent party. In both cases, the
innocent party will be compensated for his out-of-pocket expenses and lost opportunities.
It is also important to mention that, under article 16(2)(b), the CISG regulates promissory
estoppel. According to this article, an offer can be withdrawn at any time before its acceptance
except when is reasonable to believe that the offeree in reliance on the offer acted in a certain way.
For instance, the party commenced investment in production, hired some employees and
invested in infrastructure, and as a consequence, will suffer damages if the offer is revoked.
Thus, he should be allowed to recover damages in reliance. In my view, this protection can be
extended to pre-contractual agreements because we are facing similar situations. In pre-
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contractual negotiations, we have a party who acted in reliance on the negotiations and as a
consequence researched the business, invested money and time learning the opportunities and
benefits of the future contract. Therefore, in case of an unjustified withdraw of the negotiations
the blameworthy party should be held responsible for the damages caused in reliance.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is true that there is no provision in the CISG that specifically regulates pre-contractual
liability. In this respect, the CISG is silent. However, its application can be inferred from its
general principles and provisions and from the interpretation of the Convention as a whole. As
stated before, the first step is to look to article 7(1), which indicates the international character
of the Convention and its promotion of the principal of good faith in international trade. In
addition, article 7(2) indicates that where a matter is governed by the Convention but not
expressly settled in it the correct approach is to resolve the matter in accordance with the
general principles of the Convention where such principles are present.
In my opinion, the intention of the drafters of the CISG was to bind the contracting parties to
the compliance of good faith since the beginning of the negotiations of the contract of sale.
Furthermore, one must analyze the intention of the contracting parties according to Article 8.
The questions that may arise are: Was there an intention to conclude a contract? Where there
promises, statements or conduct that would lead the other contracting party to infer the
conclusion of a contract and therefore proceed with the researching the business? If these
questions are answered in the affirmative, then it is possible to infer the application of pre-
contractual liability due to the reliance of one party in the other’s statements and conduct.
Moreover, I think that the UNIDROIT provision on bargaining in good faith could be
extended to the CISG because the interpretation of the general principles of the convention
should be broader and not only limited to the general principles derived from the Convention.
Thus, it could be sustained that the principles of the UNDROIT and PECL can be used as a
source of the general principles provided in Article 7(2) CISG as it have been sustained by
Salama’s theory.
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I. INTRODUCTION* #
The purpose of this article is to address the importance of pre -contractual liability in the
regulation of contemporary commercial relations in an international context.
In first instance, I will address the regulation of pre-contractual agreements under Colombian
domestic law. Second, I will be briefly comparing the application and regulation of pre-
contractual liability in Colombian domestic law with its application in American law. Finally, I
will address its application under the CISG and I will include a brief comparison of this
Convention with Colombian domestic law in respect to this matter.
In addition, I will provide practical examples to illustrate the application of pre-contractual
liability under Colombian domestic law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG).
II. THE EFFECTS OF PRE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS IN COLOMBIA AND
THEIR LIABILITY UNDER THE DOMESTIC LAW
A. Brief Historical Prospective of Pre-Contractual Liability
The law, the doctrine and the jurisprudence in civil law jurisdictions have been regulating issues
related to contractual and extra-contractual liability for centuries. However, only in the last
century have they turned their attention to pre-contractual liability.
In the early years, there was a dilemma in respect to the recognition of pre-contractual liability
because it was understood that this pre-contractual stage did not generate responsibility for the
parties because there was not a contract and they had freedom to decide whether they wanted
to proceed with the negotiations or simply back out from them. Therefore, any cost spent by
the parties in pre-contractual negotiations should been assumed by them if the contract failed
to materialize.
* The subject matter of this paper is an analysis of the CISG Article 7(1) and its consequences. I also examine the
Norwegian implementation of the Convention, how the Norwegian approach relates to the obligations set forth in
Article 7(1), and whether that approach is a loyal compliance with those obligations. I further address the problems
caused by the Norwegian transformation and how those problems might be solved.
# This essay states the law as at 25 January 2007.
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Conversely, it had been held by some scholars that pre-contractual agreements caused liability.
In their opinion, the parties acquire obligations and rights during the pre-contractual stage. For
instance, where two parties have been engaged in extended negotiations for the purchase of a
complex business, they ought to owe to each other the obligation to act in good faith.
Therefore, after one party has invested a large amount of money studying and researching the
business due to its complexity and in reliance on the other party’s intention to reach a future
agreement, the party ought to be compensated for the economical loss caused by the unjustified
withdraw from the negotiations by the other party. The innocent party should be able to
demand the relief for the damage caused by such conduct. The innocent party should be
allowed to recover the pecuniary loss for the cost of his investment and the loss of
opportunities.
These situations were the ones that inspired Rudolph von Jhering to write his monographic on
“ culpa in contrahendo.” 1 His goal was to eliminate the injustice that was generated by the
impossibility to impose responsibility on the party that without justification and reason
withdrew from pre-contractual negotiations causing damages to the other contracting party. It is
imperative to indicate that the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo is intimately related to the
concept of good faith and presupposes fault or negligence by the guilty party.
Precisely, the foundation of the Jhering theory is based on the principle of the good faith that
has to be observed between the contracting parties since the beginning of the negotiations.
The doctrine of pre-contractual liability considers the damages that occur as a consequence of
the conduct of one of the parties that produced the nullity of the contract or generated the
conditions for the cancellation of the negotiations. As mentioned above, the doctrine also
considers the damages generated by the intentional and unjustified rupture of the negations by
one of the parties.
One example of such conduct is when the seller, knowing that he is not the owner of the goods,
sells them to the buyer. In such a situation, the contract will be void because it will be
impossible for the performance of the contract since the goods belong to a third party who is
not part of the transaction and will claim his ownership of the goods.
Similarly, under the doctrine of pre-contractual liability, a party will be held liable for damages
when initiating the previous negotiations with respect to the purchase of a corporation with the
intention to gather confidential information of the business and abruptly interrupt the
negotiations after the accomplishment of this purpose.
Before the formulation of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, the law appeared to have ignored
pre-contractual stages, more specifically what happened before the formation of the contract,
even though, the parties had been involved in extended, complex and expensive negotiations
that required them to act in good faith and with due diligence.
1 Rudolph von Jhering, “ Culpa in contrahendo: oder Schadensersatz bei michtigen oder nicht zur Perfektion
gelangten Verträgen, Jherings Jahrbücher !V (1861) 1-113.
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This historical perspective leads one to think that pre-contractual liability is supported not only
in Jhering’s theory but also in the principles of good faith, fair dealing and unjust enrichment.
It is paramount that once parties enter into contractual negotiations, they owe to each other a
relationship of trust and confidence regardless of the negotiation’s success or failure.
B. Pre-Contractual Agreements and Their Liability Under Colombian Law
Pre-contractual agreements are intimately connected with what are called “ pre contractual
relations.”  Pre-contractual relations arise between the parties who are interested in entering into
a contract. These relations arise from the first contacts between the parties until the adoption of
a preparatory contract. Such preparatory contracts are termed under the Colombian legislation
“ la option o la promesa de contratar”  which means the option or the promise to enter into a
contract. This stage is known as the “ pre-contractual period.” 2
In our complex economic world, we can find that there are contracts that can be concluded
instantaneously according to the nature of their object or their small economic value such as
the trading of regular and domestic consumer products which are displayed on supermarket
shelves with their prices marked indicating that offers to the public have been made and
therefore, it is possible to immediately acquire them for the payment of the price by the
consumer. However, there are other kinds of contracts that for their nature and high economic
value require a long period of negotiation as well as technical and budget studies by the
contracting parties; therefore, the formation of such contracts is progressive. Such contracts, for
instance, can be for the construction of complex structures like airports, railroads or the
purchase of banks or large corporations.3
Moreover, it is in this type of contract where pre-contractual agreements take place. They
constitute an important stage where the parties have the opportunity to discuss, learn and
discover the advantages and disadvantages of the business. It is in this stage where the parties
gather the confidential information of the business such as technical studies, production,
marketability of the products, and industrial standards. In this stage, the party interested in the
purchase of the business or company may invest a large amount of money as well as time in
order to get the information required to make an informed decision in respect to the possible
offer and later the conclusion of the contract. These pre-negotiations are called in different civil
legislations “ Tratos preliminaries” , “ Conversaciones Previas”  or “ Tratativas” .
Colombian legislation regulates the liability of pre-contractual agreements under Article 863 of
the Commercial Code, which provides that the parties shall act in good faith and without fault
during pre-contractual negotiations, and that in case of the violation of this provision, the party
at fault will be liable for damages caused to the innocent party.
Moreover, Article 872 of the Colombia Commercial Code provides that the celebration and
execution of the contract shall be in good faith. As indicated above, this concept has been
extended to the pre-contractual stage. Therefore, the parties have the duty to act in good faith
2 Gabriel Escovar Sanin, Negocios Civiles y Comerciales Tomo II, Dike 379 (1994).
3 Id. at 380.
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and without fault, which means that it is not sufficient that they are convinced that they are
acting according to the principles of good faith but that they are acting without negligence.
Additionally, Article 830 of the Colombia Commercial Code indicates that a person who
abuses his rights and harms another would be liable for the damages caused to the innocent
party. This is called “ Abuso del Derecho”  and it is one of the principles that inspired pre-
contractual liability. Finally, Article 831 is related to the principle of unjust enrichment.
Accordingly, the importance of the pre-contractual stage is not only related to the protection of
the parties against negligence, unfair practices and unjust enrichment, but it is fundamental to
the interpretation of the contract. Therefore, the initial acts, agreements, and negotiations
between the parties tending toward the celebration and culmination of the contract will
indicate their intention to enter into a future contract. For that reason the Colombia Civil
Code in Article 1618 indicates that, once the intention of the contracting parties is known,
such intention prevails over the literal interpretation of provisions of the contract.
In Colombia, pre-contractual liability does not require the element of “ culpa”  (fault), it only
requires the arbitrary rupture of the negotiations; even if such rupture by the contractual party
is without fault it will generate liability. The fundamental point is that it goes against
commercial equity and good faith. Therefore, the law should not permit one to unfairly
withdraw from pre-contractual negotiations without legal consequences in situations in which a
party has invested a large amount of money and work searching the business. The importance
here it is to protect the parties’ patrimonial interest because the frustration of pre-contractual
negotiations can caused the same or superior damages as those cause by the breach of the
executed contract.
Colombian’s Supreme Court has studied the implication of liability for pre-contractual
agreements and has encountered some difficulties in the interpretation of the limits of liability
and how best to frame the appropriate level of responsibility. The Court’s major concern is not
to contravene the ambit of freedom of contract.
In addition, the Colombia Supreme Court had held that the compensation for damages caused
by one contractual party to the other at the pre-contractual stage is divided into two different
categories as follows: “ daño emergente”  and “ lucro cesante.”
“ Daño emergente”  had been defined as the harm suffered by the injured party for the loss of
expenses and financial inversions made during the pre-contractual stage. Colombia’s legislation
considered that these expenses constitute a negative contractual interest for the abrupt and
unjustified rupture of pre-contractual negotiations. In consequence, this interest is limited to
the amount of the loss of expenses.
This negative interest does not include the expectation interest that the party could have if the
contract would have been executed. Moreover, “ daño emergente”  includes the monetary
correction.
The interest that emerges from the breach of a valid executed contract is known as “ interés de
cumplimiento”  or “ interés positivo”  (positive interests) because its goal is to put the contracting
party in the same financial situation that he would have been if the contract had been
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performed. The positive interest is the equivalent to the American expectation interest for the
breach of a contract. However, the negative interest, which is also know as an “ interés de
confianza”  (trust interest), is oriented to compensate the injured party for the loss of expenses
that he incurred during pre-contractual negotiation as a consequence of his reliance on the
other contracting party interest to continue with the negotiations to finally execute a contract.
The negative interest is similar to the American reliance interest for the breach of contract but
at a pre-contractual stage.
According to Pedro Lafont Pianetta, who is a Colombian Supreme Court Justice, the negative
interest compensates for the loss of expenses, material and moral damage that result from the
frustration of pre-contractual agreements. The goal is to bring the injured party to the same
financial situation that he was in before he started with pre-contractual negotiations.4
Moreover, Gabriel Escovar Sanin indicated that the negative interest has two aspects:
1. The necessity to repair the harm caused by the reliance on the other contractual
party, for the trust in her promise
2. The necessity to support and encourage trust and good faith in commercial
negotiations.5
The understanding of these two aspects is fundamental for the integral interpretation and
understanding of the primary goal of pre-contractual liability and its compensation system.
Moreover, the “ lucro cesante”  is defined as a lost of the opportunities that the injured party
suffered on reliance of pre-contractual negotiations. In Colombia this is call “ perdida del chance”
(loss of a chance). This situation is presented when an innocent party refused to enter into the
negotiations of another contract offered by a third party in reliance of the on-going negotiations
with the guilty party. In such case the party at fault has to pay for the loss of opportunities
suffered by the injured party.
Colombia Supreme Court Justice Alejandro Bonivento has indicated that the compensation for
the breach of pre-contractual negotiations is composed of the “ daño emergente”  and “ lucro
cesante” , therefore both interests have to be calculated in order to determine the final
compensation.6
However, there was a polemic in relation to the amount of damages that should be paid as a
consequence of the “ lucro cesante” . The Supreme Court has held that this interest should be
measured by the loss of profit that the injured party suffered for the loss of opportunities. For
instance, the losses of profits caused when the party refuse to accept another contract proposed
by a third party at the same time that he was involved in the negotiations of the frustrated
contract.7
4 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentnecia de Junio 27 de 1990, M.P: Dr. Pedro Lafont Pianetta.
5 Sanin, supra note 1, at 394
6 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentencia de Noviembre 23 de 1989, M.P: Dr. Jose Alejandro Bonivento Fernandez
7 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentencia de Noviembre 23 de 1989, M.P: Dr. Jose Alejandro Bonivento Fernandez
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Finally, pre-contractual liability in Colombia seems to be similar to the reliance interest, and the
American doctrine of promissory estoppel in contracts. The concepts of “ daño emergente”  and
“ lucro cesante”  have the same inspiration as the principle of the reliance interest: to place the
injured party in the same situation as he was before the contract was made. However, the main
difference is that such liability is generated in Colombia from the first negotiations and
agreements between the parties in pre-contractual stages where there is a tacit agreement
between the parties to act in accordance with good faith, fair business, diligence and loyalty.
Also, in Colombia there are three stages in the formation of a contract as follows: the first is
pre-contractual agreements or negotiations, the second, is the contractual stage and the last is
the post-contractual stage. Each of these stages generates liability to the parties in case of breach.
C. Hypothetical Examples to Illustrate How Pre-contractual Liability is Applied in Colombia
The following are some examples of the situations where pre-contractual liability occurs as
defined in Colombia.
a. A company accepted an engineer as a capital partner in the company. The engineer in
reliance on the word of the company’s President and CEO proceeded to sell some of his
properties at a lower price than the commercial price because he wanted to collect the amount
of money that he had to pay to become a partner. Also, at the same time, he quit his job in
another company. However, a few hours before the execution of the document that recognized
him as a partner, the company notified him that they changed the qualifications of admission
of the possible partner, and under these new requirements it was impossible for him to become
a partner of the company8.
In this case, the company, even without the existence of a contract, should be responsible for
the damages caused to the innocent party because in reliance on their word he left his job and
proceeded to sell his properties to respond for the payment that the company required him to
make as a capital partner. Here, one party unfairly raised in the other party a hope that a
contract will be made.
b. Juan was an old and outstanding client of a bank. He asked for a loan of $500,000.00
dollars (This sum was lower than of the prior sums loaned to him by the bank.) He needed this
money for the purchase of some equipment for his company. In compliance with the prior
practices with the bank, and the bank holding his mortgages, and the bank’s manager’s oral
confirmation of acceptance of the loan, he proceeded to negotiate for the industrial equipment
with the seller and signed a promise of purchase. After the negotiation, he went to the bank to
pick up the money for the payment of the equipment. However, he was informed that the
credit committee declined his petition for the loan due to a restriction on loans. Juan’s
financial situation and payments to the institution had been outstanding and did not change
from the prior times when he asked the bank for loans. As a consequence, of the negative
8 Sanin, Supra note 1, at 423.
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actions of the bank Juan had to pay the amount of a penal clause and suffer enormous
detriments in the development and progress of his company.9
In this example, the bank’s manager made a promise to Juan and broke that promise. Therefore,
the bank under the law on pre-contractual agreements, is responsible for the damages caused for
their negative action on the loan. The bank’s manager knew that, in accordance with prior
practices and dealings with Juan, he would commence the negotiations for the equipment and
the bank manager’s word of acceptance would give Juan a green light to even sign a promise of
purchase. Juan acted in reliance on prior practices and the manager’s word. In this case, as in the
first example, there was a hope that a future contract would be made.
D. Brief Comparison Between Pre-contractual Liability as Applied in Colombia and under American
Law
The first example that I gave to illustrate the application of pre-contractual agreements under
the Colombian legislation is similar in a way to the case of Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. where the
plaintiff worked for a long time for the defendant and in consideration of his years of services
and in gratitude for his hard work, the company made a resolution to recognized an extra
payment for the plaintiff upon his retirement (Two hundred dollars for life). The plaintiff, in
reliance on this promise, retired. The company made the promised payments for some time
until they decided to stop the payments arguing that a promise to make a gift is not binding
without consideration and in their case the payment was only a promise and not a standing
contract. The court held that in the instant case the plaintiff acted on reliance upon the
promise contained in the resolution, and this therefore created an enforceable contract under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. (See § 90 of the Restatement Second of Contracts.) Here
the plaintiff, in reliance on the promise, retired. The defendant should have reasonably
expected that the plaintiff would act in reliance on their promise; in other words, the defendant
induced the plaintiff to retire. Consequently, the court ordered the payments for life.10
It is imperative to mention the similarities between the concepts of reliance interest and
promissory estoppel in American law and the effects of concept of pre-contractual liability in
Colombia. First, under the concepts of reliance interest and the promissory estoppel, the
contractual liability arises when one of the parties makes a promise to the other contractual
party as a part of the contract. These two concepts presuppose the existence of a valid contract
and, as a consequence of it, one party changes his position during the contractual stage in
reliance upon the other party promises to perform the contract. Whereas in Colombia pre-
contractual liability is imposed as a consequence of the reliance of one party on the other
party’s promise or inducement to believe that it would be a probable conclusion of a future
contract, this liability is generated as a consequence of the rupture of pre-contractual
negotiations and the detriment suffered by one party due to the other side’s inducement to
believe in the possibility of a future contract. Therefore, this kind of liability does not suppose
the breach of a valid contract, merely the breach or rupture of the negotiations.
9 Sanin, Supra note 1, at 424 .
10 Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. 322 S.W. 2d 163 (MO. Ct. App.1959)
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In general. the American legal system does not provide for the concept of culpa in contrahendo or
pre-contractual liability. However, Puerto Rico has contemplated the doctrine of the culpa in
contrahendo in its legislation as a consequence of its civil law system. In contrast, the common
law states do not recognize the fundamentals of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo and pre-
contractual liability.
As I have mentioned before, Colombian’s legislation statutorily regulates the figures of culpa in
contrahendo and, specifically, the liability of pre-contractual agreements.
Colombia’s legislation provides remedies for reliance where there has been an arbitrary rupture
of pre-contractual negotiations. In consequence, the guilty party will be obligated to pay for the
damages cause to the innocent party, who in reliance of the other’s word and behavior invests
time and money in the initial pre-negotiations stage in order to know the details and gather the
information required to make an informed decision before the celebration of the contract.
With respect to the doctrine of the promissory estoppel, Günter Kühne has stated that
philosophically it was developed as a consequence of the insufficiency of reliance produce by
the bargain and the exchange concept consideration:
“ In the United States the promissory estoppel took over the tract to make up for the reliance
deficit produced by the bargain and the exchange philosophy of the consideration principle. It
became an instrument to enforce gratuitous promises where one, relying on the promise,
changed his position and incurred financial losses.” 11
The concept of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is similar to the conception of pre-
contractual liability in Colombia in the fact that the main inspiration is to avoid unjust
enrichment, to promote fair business practices, and to imposed responsibility on the party who
either intentionally or unintentionally made a promise to another and had reason to know that
the other party will act in a certain way in reliance on his promise.
The difference is that promissory estoppel operates on a contractual stage, in other words,
where a valid contract has been made, and to lock in the offer in a bid case once the contractor
has notified the subcontractor that he won the contract.
However, pre-contractual agreements do not require the formation of a valid contract, only the
pre-negotiations of it whether or not they come to fruition. Pre-contractual agreements do not
require the complete meeting of the minds as is required to obtained relief under the concept
of promissory estoppel and the reliance interest in American law.
Pre-contractual agreements only required that the party seeking recovery had reason to conclude
from the other party’s conduct that a future contract will be made. Here, what is punished is
the careless inducement in reliance and the late rupture of negotiations and frustration of
11 Kühne, Günter, Promissory estoppel and culpa in contrahendo, 10 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law, Tel Aviv
282 (1990).
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reliance investment. Consequently, the main point is to recover for the reliance invested during
the dealing and the recovery for the economic loss.12
Günter Kuhne indicates that in the case of culpa in contrahendo and pre-contractual liability, it is
possible to conclude that liability of the party is recognized based on two elements:
a. “ Violation of a pre-contractual duty, which is the duty in regard to the contractual
process before a break-off. (The duty is not to rupture negotiations for other than
valid reasons, so the break-of itself caused liability.)
b. The inducement of reliance action to the detriment of the other party. One party
changes his position in reliance of the other one promise and behavior.” 13
In respect to the liability imposed through these two elements, it is clear that the parties owed
to each other the obligation to act in good faith since the beginning of the negotiations. It is
also reasonable to expect the reliance of the other party in the negotiations in changing his
position to investigate and gather the prudence information in respect to the business.
Consequently, the party might hire attorneys, accountants, engineers and any kind of
consultants that he might require to understand and to inform him with respect to the business
in negotiation. Therefore, the blameworthy party will be liable for the arbitrary rupture of the
negotiations due to the investment made by the other party on reliance on the possible
contract, based on the behavior and promises of the other party. In conclusion, it is possible to
understand that the liability imposed through these two elements was the natural consequence
of its breach.
Moreover, another difference between the Colombian’ legislation and the American law in
respect to pre-contractual agreements is that the element of good faith is not require in America
in pre-contractual stages. In other words, it is not extended to the negotiations. There is not a
specific duty to bargain in good faith but there is a duty to be performed in good faith
obligation, which is imposed during the contractual stage. Consequently, the Uniform
Commercial Code requires merchants to perform in good faith and fair dealing. For instance,
in the case of a merchant, the good faith element imposes on him the obligation to observe
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade and to perform with respect of
such standards.14 While in Colombia, the Commercial Code imposes an obligation on the
contractual parties to observe good faith during the pre-contractual stage, Therefore, the
blameworthy party would be liable for his breach of such duty. The fundamental point of such
provision is that during the pre-contractual stage the parties engaged in the negotiations build
between them relationships based on trust similar to the ones that arise in the contractual stage,
so they will have to comply with a high standard of care.
In conclusion, pre-contractual liability in Colombia has a high importance in the contractual
relations between the parties and therefore the Commercial and Civil Code regulates it
extensively. Its goal is to promote good faith and fair dealing during all the contractual stages
and as well as to prevent the unjust enrichment of one of the parties to the detriment of the
12 Id. at 282
13 Kühne, Supra note10, at 288
14 Kessler, Friedrich/Fine, Edith, Culpa in contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract: A
comparative Study, Harvard Law Review, 1964. Pg 408.
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other party. The goal of the concept of pre-contractual liability is to restore the damages
suffered by one party in reliance on the blameworthy party.
During the negotiation of pre-contractual agreements, some obligations and rights are
generated to the parties. The main obligation is to act in good faith, meaning that the parties
have to initiate the negotiations with the intention to reach an agreement, and to withdraw as
soon as possible, before the other party, in reliance of the negotiations, invests in the research
of the business. Also, good faith requires the obligation of reserve which means that
information with respect to the business and financial situation of one of the parties ought not
to be disclosed if it is confidential. Finally, it requires the obligation of custody and
conservation of all the material that has been given to the parties in the course of the
negotiations. The withdrawal itself does not cause the liability. There has to be some kind of
unfair act such as not intending to reach an agreement and omitting to communicate the
determination to he other party, not disclosing trustworthy information, or continuing the
negotiations after realizing that the contract will never be concluded.
III. A BRIEF VIEW OF PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY UNDER THE CISG
We cannot find any provision in the CISG that specifically regulates pre-contractual liability. In
this respect, the CISG is silent. However, the application of this concept can nevertheless be
inferred from the CISG’s general principles, from its provisions and from its interpretation as a
whole. The first approach is to look at article 7(1), which addresses the international character
of the Convention and its promotion of the principle of good faith in international trade. One
then turns to article 7(2) which indicates that, for matters governed by the Convention, but not
expressly settled in it, the correct approach is to interpret the matter according to the general
principles of the Convention, where such principles are present. Article 8 of the CISG is also
highly relevant.
A. Applicability of Pre-Contractual Agreements under the CISG According to Article 7 and Article 8
In my view, in order to have a full understanding of the application of pre-contractual liability
under the CISG, one must review the legislative history of article 7 which refers to the good
faith principal. I will emphasize in its importance.
According to the legislative records of the Vienna Diplomatic Conference at which the CISG
was promulgated, there was a lack of consensus as to the meaning of the principle of good faith
provided in article 7. The following are some of the views that were discussed in respect to the
inclusion of good faith in international trade:
“ Colloquy at Diplomatic Conference on Proposal to provide a more specific reference to good faith
(“ Article [7] [is] not the appropriate place for a reference to a principal of major importance in
international trade relations. A separate article [is] required.”  Proposal rejected”  Comments by
delegates, some regarding a good faith requirement as present without such a separate article; some
not wanting such an article because it would document the existence of a good faith requirement
applicable to a contracting parties. OR 257-259,paras. 40-56 [OR=Official Records of the
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United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna 10 March-
11 April 1980, A/CONF. 97/19]” 15
The draft of article 6 that was presented in 1978 was approved as article 7(1) of the official text
of the CISG.
The major modifications proposed were presented by Italy and Norway as follows:
“ [Italy (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.59):
Delete the words “ and the observance of the good faith in international trade”  (cf. in this respect
the proposed new article 6 [became CISG article 7] ter) and add new sentence:
“ questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settle therein
shall be settle in conformity with the general principles on which this Convention is based or, in
the absence of such principles, by taking account of the national law of each of the parties.” ]
[Add a new article 6 [became article 7] ter to read as follows:
“ In the formation [interpretation] and performance of a contract of sale the parties shall observe
the principles of the good faith and international co-operation.” ]
{Norway (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.28):
Delete the words:
“ and the observance of the good faith in international trade”
Article [6] [became article 7]” 16
During the discussions, Mr. Bonell, who was a member of the Italian delegation indicated that
an inclusion of a provision regulating the observance of good faith principle was required in the
CISG. Therefore, he supported and proposed the adoption of a separate provision for the
regulation of a major principle of good faith. In addition, he stated that his delegation
proposed to add a reference to “ international cooperation”  with the intention to clarify that
only those aspects of good faith that were internationally acceptable would apply to the
interpretation of the principles under the CISG.17
Mr. Rognlien, of Norway, stated that the reference to the principle of good faith should be
transferred from article 6 to article 7. He also indicated that the observance of good faith was
related to the contract between the parties not to the interpretation of the provisions of the
Convention. Therefore, he considered that the reference to good faith should be transferred
from article 6 to article 7 (which become article 8 (3) of the CISG). He disagreed with the
inclusion of the reference to the international cooperation proposed by Italy.18
Miss O’Flynn who represented United Kingdom stated that there was no need to add a new
article for the provision of the good faith as it was proposed by Italy. She indicated that the
15 Article 7 Colloquy, Interpretation of the Convention. Points of view expressed at Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, Colloquy on issue related to a good faith: proposal to add to CISG a version of concept of culpa in
contrahendo (pre-contractual liability): proposal rejected [Official Records 294-295, paras. 77-87] (1980)
16 Id. at 294-295
17 Id.
18 Id..
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meaning of the article involved an uncertain interpretation, the principles of the good faith
were not defined, and there was no provision for the application of sanctions that would be
applied as a consequence of the failure of one party to act in good faith. In conclusion, she did
not support the Italian proposal.19
Finally, Mr. Allan Farnsworth, representing the United States, noted that he had a preference
for the existing text because the Italian proposal with respect to the application and
interpretation of the good faith in an international context was uncertain and dangerous.20
The issue related to the prohibition of the parties from departing from their obligation to act in
good faith was debated during the discussion related to the principal of good faith. A Canadian
proposal read as follows:
“ Change article 5 [became CISG article 6] to read as follows:
(Canada (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.10):
“ (1) The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 11 [became
CISG article 12], derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. However, except were
the parties have wholly excluded this Convention, the obligation of good faith, diligence and
reasonable care prescribe by this Convention may not be excluded by agreement, but the parties
may by agreement determinate the standards by which the performance of such obligations are to
be measure if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.]” 21
With respect to this issue, Mr. Farnsworth indicated that he did not support the Canadian
proposal because it will impose a general obligation of good faith. The majority of the
committee was against the Canadian proposal therefore it was not approved.
Finally, the committees discussed a proposal specifically related to pre-contractual liability. The
delegates from the German Democratic Republic proposed that a new article on this subject be
added to Part II of the Convention. (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.95). The following are some of the
comments with respect to this proposal:22
“ 78. Mr. PLUNKETT (Ireland) asked whether the proposal envisaged that compensation would
be payable even if no contract had been conclude, or if a contract had been conclude, whether it
should be payable for something other than a breach of contract.
“ 79. Mr. MASKOW (German Democratic Republic) replied that it was the essence of his
proposal that compensation for expenses could be claim even if there were no contract.
“ 80. Mr. BONELL (Italy) strongly supported the proposal. His delegation had already submitted
a proposal along similar lines. The existing text of the Convention did not take sufficiently into
account cases where no contract was concluded but the parties had engaged in detailed
negotiations at the pre-contractual stage. Such cases needed regulation because of the risk that one
of the parties might abuse its position and act in such a way as to damage the interest of the other
party. He thought the drafting of the proposal could be improved, notably by the deletion of the
phrase “ in the course of the preliminary negotiations” , and also by the inclusion of a phrase to
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Official records pp 257-259
22 Id. at 294-295.
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cover the situation in which the party had not necessarily had expenses, but had suffered damages.
He suggested that an ad hoc working group be set up to produce an agreed text.
“ 81. Mr. SCHLECHTRIEM (Federal Republic of Germany) sympathized with the object of the
proposal but considered it much too far-reaching. Such a general clause might change some of the
solutions of the draft, e.g., the provisions dealing with the obligations of the parties or with the
revocability of the offer. It would touch on the problem of form requirements and would also affect
matters outside the scope of the Convention such as the avoidance of the contract for errors, or the
authority of agents.
“ 82. Mr. BENNETT (Australia) said that he had great difficulty with the proposal. It referred to
a failure in duty to take reasonable care, a notion that was not found anywhere else in the
Convention. It was not clear what was the standard of reasonable care that was envisaged. The
problem was an important one and not merely one of drafting.”
As it is reflected in the reading of the opinions, the proposal for pre-contractual liability was
highly objected to by members if the committee and was not agreed on.
However, in my opinion, the failure of the approval of the committee to adopt this provision
on the regulation of pre-contractual liability under the CSIG was the result of a lack of
understanding of the concept by the common law delegations. As I indicated in the first
chapter of this article, pre-contractual liability has not been recognized as a part of the
contractual law at common law jurisdictions. I think that their major fear is to contravene the
principal of freedom of contract. Conversely, the position of the common law jurisdictions, in
their effort to protect freedom of contract, is lacking in protection for the contractual parties
during pre-contractual negotiations. It is my view that this is a dangerous approach because
during pre-contractual negotiations the damages that can result by the unjustified withdraw of
the negotiations can be major or equal to the damages caused by the breach of the contract.
Therefore, in order to avoid unjust enrichment and honor the principles of good faith and fair
dealing from the beginning of the negotiations of a probable contract, the concept of pre-
contractual liability should be regarded as a part of contract law.
In addition to its discussion at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, the concept of pre-
contractual liability had been discussed earlier in 1977 at the 9th session where the UNCITRAL
Working Group presented its finished draft of the “ Formation of the Contract.”  The draft
included the requirement that fair dealing and good faith had to be observed by the parties
during the course of the formation of the contract. The German Democratic Republic
suggested that a third paragraph be added to the proposal of Hungary (as indicated above such
proposal was raised and objected in the Vienna Conference).
In addition, the German Democratic Republic maintained that the observance of fair dealing
and good faith was required from the parties during the course of formation of the contract
and, if during the preparation and formation of the contract one of the parties violated their
duties of customer care the other party had the right to claim compensation for the economic
loss.23
23 UNCITRAL Yearbook IX, (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 pp 66-67; Honnold Documentary History pp 298-299.
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Furthermore, for some of the drafters the concept of good faith and fair dealing was considered
a moral obligation. Therefore, it was highly important that they elevated these principals to the
stage of a legal obligation. However, they were concerned that the application of such principles
to particular transactions might not lead to the development of a uniformed and coherent case
law in international trade because each national court might be influenced by its own legal
traditions and beliefs. To conclude, it was the majority opinion that the proposals for pre-
contractual liability under the CISG were properly rejected. The view that prevails is that pre-
contractual liability is not part of the scope of the Convention. However, there is a minority
opinion to the effect that, even though the CISG does not include an express provision dealing
with pre-contractual liability, it will be possible for the tribunals to impose its application by the
interpretation of the general provision of observance of good faith in international trade and
the interpretation of the principals of the Convention as a whole. Respect to this point, Bonell
has noted:24
“ The fact that CISG does not have a provision expressly dealing with the pre-contractual liability
of the parties for theirs conduct during the negotiations does not necessarily mean that the issue
fall outside the scope of the Convention. In fact, pre-contractual liability could simply be -- to use
the language of Article 7 —  one of those questions concerning matters governed by [the] Convention
which are not expressly settled in it… . Issues which are outside the scope of the Convention
continue to be governed by domestic law while, in the case of simple lacuna, the solution has to be
found primarily within the Convention itself, i.e., in conformity with the general principles on
which it is based, and only in the absence of such principles, may resort be had to the law
applicable by virtue of the relevant conflict of law rules (Cf. Article 7(2))… .”
I agree with Professor Bonell. It is clear that pre-contractual liability should not be considered
outside the scope of the CISG. Its application can be possible through the interpretation of the
Convention as a whole and in conformity with the application of its general principles. From
the analysis of the principles of good faith, and fair dealing in conjunction with the
interpretation of the conduct and intention of the parties, it is possible to establish the
existence of a pre-contractual liability under the CISG.
Additionally, the application of the principles of good faith and fair dealing has also been
recognized by the UNIDROIT Principles. Article 1.7 regulates the general application of the
principal of good faith and fair dealing in international trade. Furthermore, the article indicates
that the parties cannot “ exclude or limit such obligation.” 25
Moreover, Article 2.1.15 which rules on negotiations in bad faith provides:26
A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement.
However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable for the losses
caused to the other party.
24 Bonnell “ Formation of Contracts and Pre-Contractual Liability Under the Vienna Convention on International
Sale of Goods” Formation of Contracts and pre-contractual liability (ICC Publishing Pub. No. 440/9: 1990) pp 167-171.
25 Steven J. Burton and Melvin A. Eisenberg, Contract Law: Selected Sources Materials, UNIDROIT Pinciples,Thomson
West p381 (2006)
26 Id. at 384.
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It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations when intending not
to reach an agreement with the other party.”
According to Rodrigo Novoa, it is possible for the courts to find that the adoption of pre-
contractual duty to bargain in good faith under the UNIDROIT could be extended to the
CISG because the main purpose of the UNIDROIT principles is to provide guidelines for the
interpretation and application of the uniform law instruments on international commercial
contracts such as the CISG. Therefore, it is probable that the adoption of the pre-contractual
duty to bargain in good faith by the UNDROIT principles might persuade a court that this duty
is also present under the CISG.27
Moreover, Shani Salama considered that article 7(2) of the CISG provides an interpretation
tool of the Convention. Therefore, when the courts are filling the gaps encountered in the
interpretation of a matter that is not settled in the Convention like the pre-contractual liability
they should look at article 7(2) and interpret such matters within the general principles that
inspired the Convention. According to Salama the interpretation under article 7(2) required
the use of hierarchy methods of interpretation. She indicates that the first approach by a court
when it is filling the gaps under the CISG is to look at the provisions and the general principles
that inspired the Convention even if the matter is not expressively settled. Second, if the matter
is excluded of the scope of the convention, for instance, the liability of the seller for death and
personal injury (art 5 CISG), such matter should be resolved according to the rules applicable
under the private international law and not the CISG. In consequence, article 7(2) would be
inapplicable.28
Furthermore, she emphasized that the scholars have not been clear in respect to the
interpretation of the definition of “ general principles that inspired the CISG. She noted:
“ The definition of “ general principles upon which the Convention is based”  falls short of receiving
any clear interpretation in the scholarly works. Reference is made to these principles in article 7(2)
without further explanation. Jeffrey Hartwing writes that the “ general principles are to be derived
from the Convention’s own provisions” . Moreover, Professor Honnold writes that a “ particular
general principal must be moored to premises that underlie specific provisions of the convention.” 29
In addition, Salama indicates that the interpretation of the general principles of the
Convention should be broader then just limiting their construction only to the general
principles that derive from the Convention. Moreover, such construction should not even be
limited to the intent of the drafters. The interpretation of the general principles should be
broader according to the international character of the Convention article 7(1). In
consequence, Salama considered that the courts should look carefully and extensively to the
general principles of the Convention because it is a living body capable of changes and
adaptation to the new commercial transactions in international commerce. Thus the
interpretation of the general principles of the Convention should follow the changes and
27 Rodrigo Novoa, Culpa in contrahendo: A Comparative Law Study: Chilean Law and the United Nations Convention On
Contracts For The International Sale Of Goods (CISG),22 Ariz. J. Int’L & Comp. L. 583. p 611 (2005)
28 Shani Salama, Pragmatic Responses to Interpretive Impediments: Article 7 of the CISG, An Inter-American Application, 28
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review p 7-8 (Fall 2006)
29 Id at 8
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transactions in international trade. This point of view is consistent with the regulation provided
in article 7(2) because one of its goals is to resolve not expressly regulated matters like those that
will arise in the future. To conclude, she also supports the view of Professor Guilmard that
“ promotes that the use of principles of the UNDROIT and PECL as a source of general
principles in art 7(2).” 30
I really like Salama’s approach regarding the interpretation of Art 7(2). As I stated before, the
pre- contractual liability is within the scope of the CISG .Therefore, following Salama’s theory,
if a court has to decide a case on pre-contractual liability the first step for the court is to look at
the general principles that inspired the CISG because it constitutes and unsettled matter. Thus
the interpretation and regulation of the pre-contractual liability will be possible through its
principles. Consequently, there is no need to refer and resolve the case according to the private
international law. Furthermore, as Salama stated, the interpretation of the general principles of
the CISG should be broader according to its international character and not only limited to
those derived from the Convention. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the principles
of the UNDROIT and PECL constitute a source of the general principles referred in art 7 (2)
and therefore the adoption of pre-contractual duty to bargain in good faith under the
UNIDROIT could be extended to the CISG.
Finally, it is imperative to indicate that interpretation of the conduct and intention of the
parties is fundamental in the analysis of the application of the pre-contractual liability under the
CISG. Article 8 Provides:31
“ (1) For the purposes of the application of this Convention statements made by and other conduct
of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not
have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party
are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as
the other party would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had,
due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations,
any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties.”
From the reading of Article 8 of the CISG, it is clear that this provision is not related to the
interpretation of the Convention but to the interpretation of the parties’ statements,
intentions, conducts, usages and practices in light of an international contract of sale of goods.
There are two tests that apply in the interpretation of the party’s statements and conduct. The
first is the subjective test which indicates that the statements and conducts of the parties are to
be understood according with its intent (Article 8(1)) “ where the other party knew or could not have
been unaware what that intent was.” The second is the objective test, which refers to the
understanding of the statement and conduct by a reasonable person under the same
30 Id.
31 Burton and Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 350.
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circumstances (Article 8 (2)). The objective test will be applicable when the other party neither
knew or nor could have been aware of the intent.
In reference to this article, I would like to emphasize the importance of the interpretation of
the conduct, statements and intentions of the parties when they are dealing with pre-
contractual negotiations because they will lead one of the parties to rely on and conclude the
serious intentions of the other contractual party to a contract. Therefore, the party in reliance
on the other party’s statements and behaviors will study, research and invest time and money
learning the benefits and disadvantages of the future contract. Consequently, if one of the
parties abruptly withdraws from the negotiations without justification, it should be liable for
the damages caused to the other contractual party.
B. Hypothetical Case to Illustrate the Application of Pre-Contractual Liability Under the CISG.
The following is a hypothetical example that will help to illustrate the application of pre-
contractual liability under the CISG:
Wine Co. is a vineyard company located in Italy. The Company is selling its entire production
for 2006. The wine is stored in a warehouse located in a distant place. On January 2, 2006,
Wine Co. sent information to all its clients stating that it was offering its entire production in
the vineyard for 2006 but that the price could not be lower than US $6 per bottle, and its
entire production was approximately three million bottles. In addition, Wine Company advised
that clients interested in buying the production would have to respond by communication sent
to Piero Monestier, CEO of the company no later then January 30, 2006 and that a final
contract should be signed by March 30, 2006, after the inspection and testing of the product by
interested buyers. The inspection was programmed for February 16, 2006. Three South
American firms expressed interest: Concha Co. from Colombia; Toro from Chile and Tinto
from Argentina. These three clients traveled to Italy for the inspection. The inspection was held
for four days and the clients brought specialists to determine the quality of the wine. The
contract was to be awarded to the best proposal twenty days after of the inspection. However,
Wine Co. informed its clients ten days after the inspection its refusal to continue with the
negotiations. Wine Co. did not give any specific reason to its clients. The company only
indicated that due to a policy of the company the negotiation was canceled. Wine Co. knew
since January 30, that the negotiation would be canceled due to their contractual obligation
with an Italian client. However, the Company did not stop the negotiations and continued with
them until the inspection and then, only a few days before the award of the contract, withdrew
its proposal. All the countries involved in the negotiations had their relevant places of business
in countries that subscribed to the CISG. The damages caused to the clients included the loss
of out-of-pocket expenses and the loss of opportunities because they refrained from negotiating
with other providers due to the ongoing negotiations with Wine Co.
To establish a case under the concept of pre-contractual liability, four elements are required:32
32 Novoa, Supra note 27, at 583
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1. “ Preliminary negotiations;
2. Breach of the duty to bargain in good faith;
3. Causation in fact; and
4. Compensable damages.”
The hypothetical case meets these requirements. There were preliminary negotiations, (the
requirement of prior inspection of the product and the posterior communication of the offer
after 20 days of the inspection), Wine Co. without justification and in bad faith withdrew the
negotiations and, as a consequence of the rupture of the negotiations, its clients suffered
damages in reliance on its statement and conduct. Wine Co. promoted the preliminary
negotiations and did not withdraw the negotiations, as soon as it found out that such a contract
would not be concluded. The Company continued with the inspection and let the clients invest
money in their travel expenses, salary of experts and caused them to miss other opportunities.
In situations as illustrated in this hypothetical case the application of pre-contractual liability
under the CISG should be possible. First, the CISG promotes the general principals of good
faith and fair dealing. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the parties, since the beginning
of the negotiation, have the obligation to bargain in good faith and the breach of such
obligation will render legal consequences for the damages caused by the breach. Also, it is
reasonable to conclude that a party, in reliance on the other party’s promises, statements or
conduct, will proceed with the due diligence that was required to obtain the conclusion of the
contract. For instance, in the hypothetical example any reasonable person in the same situation
would have understood that Wine Co. had a serious intention to conclude the negotiations
and award the contract to the best offer (Article 8). The parties would never incur such
investment in money and work if they did not have an understanding that the proposal sent by
Wine Company was serious. Therefore, the intention of the parties was clear. The Wine
Company showed an intention to conclude a contract. It would be unfair to conclude that the
parties should pay for the cost of the inspection and travel because Wine Company required
them to execute the inspection as a condition precedent before the awarding of the contract
under circumstances in which. Wine Company knew its intention to withdraw the negotiations
but failed to communicate this determination in time. Wine Company did not act according
the general principles of good faith and fair dealing that inspire the CISG.
Conversely, I would like to think of the outcome of this case under the analysis of the majority
view that held that pre-contractual liability is outside of the scope of the CISG. In their analysis
they will probably indicate that the domestic law would apply instead of the CISG because the
Convention is silent to this respect.
In my opinion, regarding pre-contractual liability as outside the scope of the CISG will lead to
uncertainty and ambiguous interpretations and outcomes because the gap will be fulfilled
according to the provisions of the domestic laws. Therefore, if a pre-contractual liability case is
decided in common law jurisdictions, it is likely that the parties will not be allowed to recover
damages for the unjustified withdraw of pre-contractual negotiations. Conversely, if the same
case is resolved by a judge in the civil law jurisdiction, the innocent party will likely be allowed
to recover the damages caused in reliance on the other party’s intention to conclude a future
contract. In consequence, the innocent party will be compensated for the cost of expenses and
the lost of opportunities suffered during pre-contractual negotiations.
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I believe that the application of domestic law in cases of pre-contractual liability in international
contracts would infringe the major principals and goals of the CISG because it will be a lack of
unity in the interpretation and outcomes in this matter. Therefore, this conclusion would not
honor the uniformity and unity that the Convention pursues.
C. Comparison Between the Application of Pre-Contractual Liability Under the CISG and
Colombian Domestic Law
Colombian legislation regulated pre-contractual liability under the Civil and Commercial Code.
In contrast, the CISG is silent respect to this matter. The majority of the scholars opine that
pre-contractual liability is not within the scope of the CISG. However, I believe that pre-
contractual liability is regulated under the CISG and is not outside its scope.
As I indicated before, it is possible to infer its application through the interpretation of its
general principles and provisions as a whole. In consequence, the application of pre-contractual
liability is possible under the interpretation of the regulations provided in articles 7 and 8 of
the CISG.
Article 7 regulates the international character of the Convention and provides for the
promotion of good faith in international trade. In addition, this article indicates that where a
matter is governed by the Convention but not expressly settled in it, the correct approach is to
resolve the matter according to its general principles, where such principles are present.
Similarly, Article 863 of the Colombian Commercial Code sets forth the obligation of the
contracting parties to act in good faith and without fault during pre-contractual negotiations
and provides that the failure to comply with this obligation will cause the liability of the party at
fault.
In addition, Article 872 of the Commercial Code indicates that the celebration and execution
of the contracts shall be in good faith.
Moreover, the CISG in Article 8 states that the intention, statements and conduct of the
contractual parties should prevail in the interpretation of the contract.
In this aspect, the CISG is also similar to the Colombian legislation because Article 1618 of the
Colombian Civil Code states that, once the intention of the contractual party is known, that
intention prevails against the literal interpretation of the provisions of the contract.
Finally, both legislations will award damages in reliance to the innocent party. In both cases, the
innocent party will be compensated for his out-of-pocket expenses and lost opportunities.
It is also important to mention that, under article 16(2)(b), the CISG regulates promissory
estoppel. According to this article, an offer can be withdrawn at any time before its acceptance
except when is reasonable to believe that the offeree in reliance on the offer acted in a certain way.
For instance, the party commenced investment in production, hired some employees and
invested in infrastructure, and as a consequence, will suffer damages if the offer is revoked.
Thus, he should be allowed to recover damages in reliance. In my view, this protection can be
extended to pre-contractual agreements because we are facing similar situations. In pre-
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contractual negotiations, we have a party who acted in reliance on the negotiations and as a
consequence researched the business, invested money and time learning the opportunities and
benefits of the future contract. Therefore, in case of an unjustified withdraw of the negotiations
the blameworthy party should be held responsible for the damages caused in reliance.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is true that there is no provision in the CISG that specifically regulates pre-contractual
liability. In this respect, the CISG is silent. However, its application can be inferred from its
general principles and provisions and from the interpretation of the Convention as a whole. As
stated before, the first step is to look to article 7(1), which indicates the international character
of the Convention and its promotion of the principal of good faith in international trade. In
addition, article 7(2) indicates that where a matter is governed by the Convention but not
expressly settled in it the correct approach is to resolve the matter in accordance with the
general principles of the Convention where such principles are present.
In my opinion, the intention of the drafters of the CISG was to bind the contracting parties to
the compliance of good faith since the beginning of the negotiations of the contract of sale.
Furthermore, one must analyze the intention of the contracting parties according to Article 8.
The questions that may arise are: Was there an intention to conclude a contract? Where there
promises, statements or conduct that would lead the other contracting party to infer the
conclusion of a contract and therefore proceed with the researching the business? If these
questions are answered in the affirmative, then it is possible to infer the application of pre-
contractual liability due to the reliance of one party in the other’s statements and conduct.
Moreover, I think that the UNIDROIT provision on bargaining in good faith could be
extended to the CISG because the interpretation of the general principles of the convention
should be broader and not only limited to the general principles derived from the Convention.
Thus, it could be sustained that the principles of the UNDROIT and PECL can be used as a
source of the general principles provided in Article 7(2) CISG as it have been sustained by
Salama’s theory.
